Phenomenology of Sociality

<p>Phenomenological accounts of sociality in Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Scheler, Schütz, Stein and many others offer powerful lines of arguments to recast current, predominantly analytic, discussions on collective intentionality and social cognition. Against this background, the aim of this volume is to reevaluate, critically and in contemporary terms, the rich phenomenological resources regarding social reality: the interpersonal, collective and communal aspects of the life-world (<i>Lebenswelt</i>). Specifically, the book pursues three interrelated objectives: it aims 1.) to systematically explore the key phenomenological aspects of social reality; 2.) to offer novel, state-of-the-art assessments of both central and lesser-known proponents of the phenomenology of sociality (Gurwitsch, Löwith, von Hildebrand, or Walther), and 3.) to contextualize this elaborate body of work in light of contemporary social cognition research, the growing literature in analytic social ontology, and current trends in moral psychology, moral phenomenology, and social and political philosophy. The collection brings together original articles by a host of prominent scholars and upcoming young talents to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the topic. It will be essential reading for those studying phenomenological accounts of intersubjectivity, empathy, and community, including analytic, social, moral and political philosophers, and will also be of interest for social scientists and social psychologists.</p> <p>Phenomenological Discoveries Concerning the ‘We’: Mapping the Terrain <i>Thomas Szanto, Dermot Moran </i><b>Part I: Historical and Methodological Issues </b>1. Locating Shared Life in the ‘Thou’: Some Historical and Thematic Considerations <i>James Risser </i>2.<b> </b>Hannah Arendt’s Conception of Actualized Plurality <i>Sophie Loidolt </i>3. Habermas and Social Phenomenology: From <i>Verstehen</i> to <i>Lebenswelt</i> <i>Richard Wolin </i>4. Second-Person Phenomenology <i>Steven Crowell </i><b>Part II: Intersubjectivity, the ‘We-World,’ and Objectivity</b> 5. Concrete Interpersonal Encounters or Sharing a Common World: Which is More Fundamental in Phenomenological Approaches to Sociality? <i>Jo-Jo Koo</i><i> </i>6. <i>Ineinandersein </i>and <i>l’interlacs</i>: The Constitution of the Social World or ‘We-World’ (<i>Wir-Welt</i>) Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty <i>Dermot Moran </i>7. Davidson and Husserl on the Social Origin of Our Concept of Objectivity <i>Cathal O’Madagain </i><b>Part III: Social Cognition, Embodiment, and Social Emotions </b>8. From Types to Tokens: Empathy and Typification <i>Joona Taipale </i>9. An Interactionist Approach to Shared Cognition: Some Prospects and Challenges <i>Felipe Léon </i>10. "If I had to live like you, I think I’d kill myself": Social Dimensions of the Experience of Illness <i>Havi Carel</i> 11. Shame as Fellow Feeling <i>Christian Skirke</i> 12. Relating to the Dead: Social Cognition and the Phenomenology of Grief <i>Matthew Ratcliffe </i><b>Part IV: Collective Intentionality and Affectivity</b> 13. Affective Intentionality: Early Phenomenological Contributions to a New Phenomenological Sociology <i>Íngrid Vendrell Ferran </i>14. Love and Other Social Stances in Early Phenomenology <i>Alessandro Salice </i>15. Gurwitsch and the Role of Emotion in Collective Intentionality <i>Eric Chelstrom </i>16. The Affective ‘We’: Self-regulation and Shared Emotions <i>Joel Krueger </i><b>Part V: Collective Agency and Group Personhood</b> 17. Husserl on Groupings: Social Ontology and Phenomenology of We-Intentionality <i>Emanuele Caminada </i>18. Collectivizing Persons and Personifying Collectives: Reassessing Scheler on Group Personhood <i>Thomas Szanto</i> 19. Brothers in Arms: Fraternity-Terror in Sartre’s Social Ontology <i>Nicolas de Warren</i></p>