Managing Terrorism and Insurgency

<p>This book examines how governments can weaken the regenerative capabilities of terrorist and insurgent groups.</p><p>The exploration of this question takes the form of a two-tier examination of three insurgent actors whose capacity to regenerate weakened in the past: the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) of Canada the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional - Tupamaros (MLN-T) of Uruguay and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) of Northern Ireland during the mid-1970s.</p><p>At the first level of its examination the book investigates the extent to which the regenerative capacities of the FLQ MLN-T and PIRA weakened because of an increase in attrition and a decrease in recruitment. The primary objectives of this analysis are to uncover whether a declining intake of recruits played a lesser equal or greater role than a burgeoning loss of personnel in weakening the capacities to regenerate of the three insurgent actors; and in turn to shed greater light on the broader validity of the prevailing view in conflict studies that a decrease in recruitment is more important than an increase in attrition in effecting the corrosion of an insurgent actor's capacity to regenerate. </p><p>At the second level of its exploration the book assesses the effectiveness of five of the most prominent policy prescriptions in the literature and insurgent recruitment and attrition: ameliorating grievances selective repression discrediting insurgent ideology improving intelligence collection and restricting civil liberties</p><p>This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism conflict studies strategic studies and security studies in general.</p><p><strong>Cameron Crouch</strong> is currently an Analyst at Allen Consulting Group an Australian economics and public policy consulting firm. He has a PhD from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University. </p>